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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes, using country-level panel data from transition economies and Latin 
America, the impact of labor market institutions on informal economic activity. The measure 
of informal economic activity is taken from Schneider et al. (2010), the most comprehensive 
study to date. The data on institutions, which cover employment protection legislation (EPL), 
the tax wedge, the unemployment benefit level, unemployment benefit duration and union 
density, are assembled at the IZA (transition countries) and the World Bank (LAC countries). 
We find that a more regulated labor market (higher EPL) increases the size of the informal 
economy. There is also evidence that a larger tax wedge increases informality. The tax wedge 
elasticity of informal economy, when evaluated at the sample mean, is rather modest, around 
0.1%. Our results are broadly in line with the literature, which identifies labor market 
regulation and the tax wedge as important drivers of informality.  
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1. Introduction  
Informality and informal employment pose a major challenge to policy makers in all parts of 
the world. In this paper we focus on informality in the transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as in Latin America1. 
While it is difficult to precisely estimate the size of these phenomena, there can be no doubt 
that in these areas of the world a large part of economic activity is not registered or only 
partially registered and that many workers enter employment relationships that provide only 
partial or no protection against unemployment, illness and old age (see, e.g., Slonimczyk 2012 
and Lehmann and Pignatti 2007 regarding transition countries and World Bank 2007 
regarding Latin America).  
 There exists a large and growing literature that discusses the reasons why employers 
and employees are unwilling or unable to work in the formal economy.2 The empirical part of 
this literature provides evidence on the determinants of informality and informal employment 
looking, for the most part, at individual countries or, when providing a cross-country analysis, 
focusing at one determinant. In contrast, this paper is to our knowledge the first that uses 
panel data covering many countries in order to analyze the impact of a set of determinants on 
informality. We, however, restrict our analysis to the impact of labor market institutions on 
informality. In particular, using a hand-collected macro-level data set of labor market 
institutions, we pursue the question whether employment protection legislation (EPL), the tax 
wedge, the unemployment benefit level, unemployment benefit duration and union density 
affect the size of the informal economy in the ECA and LAC regions. The paper is interesting 
for its broad geographic coverage and because of the nature of the data since, having panel 
data at our disposal, we can avoid some of the pitfalls apparent in much of the empirical 
literature that is limited to OLS estimation.   
                                                 
1
 Employing World Bank nomenclature our geographic coverage extends to the ECA and LAC regions.  
2
 For a succinct summary of these reasons, see, e.g., Koettl and Weber (2012). 
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 Informality and informal employment are not only of academic interest, they are 
actually an important policy issue. There exist equity and efficiency considerations that point 
to a strong need to vigorously pursue policies that increase the shares of formal economic 
activity and employment.  
 It is certainly inequitable if part of the workforce and some firms do not pay their taxes 
since this implies that those who are formal, whether workers or entrepreneurs, have to bear a 
disproportionate burden in the financing of public goods that are also of benefit to those being 
economically active without registration. If the informal part of the economy becomes more 
substantial this can also mean that governments have to raise taxes and contributions on the 
formal part and thus have to increase the costs of being formal, which in the final analysis can 
result in even more informality and a reduced tax base. Furthermore, often workers in 
informal jobs are severely exploited and are working under conditions that can be hazardous 
to their health. 
Turning to efficiency, most economists maintain that employment in the formal sector 
is associated with a greater use of physical capital that requires human capital acquisition on 
the part of the employed workers, while the informally employed often work with little or no 
physical capital. Since physical and human capital are very important ingredients of growth, 
an economy with a relatively large formal sector will, ceteris paribus, grow at a more rapid 
pace than an economy with a smaller formal sector. In the medium run, policies combating 
informality and informal employment are thus vital for raising income and welfare of low and 
middle income countries.  
These equity and efficiency considerations clearly point to the importance of policies 
that formalize informal activities. However, the literature on informality provides us with 
competing paradigms that point to a very complex picture. We need to keep this complexity in 
mind if we want to discuss policies meant to enhance the emergence of firms and workers 
from the informal sector and informal employment relationships into regularized economic 
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activity and into regular jobs.  The existence of the informal segment of the labor market 
alongside the formal sector and the reasons posited for its existence have given rise to several 
paradigms in the literature. One key question in the labor market literature for developing 
countries is whether informal employment or self-employment reflects voluntary choice or is 
involuntary due to segmentation in the labor market (Guasch 1999). 
The traditional dualistic view, going back to Harris and Todaro (1970), sees the 
informal segment as the inferior sector, the option of last resort. Due to barriers to entry, 
minimum wages, unions or other sources of segmentation, formal jobs are rationed. Workers 
in the informal sector are crowded out from the formal sector involuntarily, their wage being 
less than that in the formal sector.3 For example, an increase in the statutory wage in the 
formal sector will reduce formal employment but lead to a lower informal wage and higher 
informal employment. During a recession informal employment and output expands because 
formal employment is reduced, while the informal labor market clears. In this view labor 
market segmentation between formality and informality is the defining feature of the labor 
market. 
In contrast, in a competitive labor market one would expect workers to be able to 
move freely between occupations, and for wages (broadly interpreted) to equalize 
accordingly. In this view the informal and informal labor markets are not segmented, but 
integrated. Voluntary choice regarding jobs and particular attributes of these jobs, such as 
flexible hours, working as a self-employed and being one’s own boss as a micro-entrepreneur, 
and not valuing social security benefits, can be the reasons for remaining in or moving to the 
informal sector (Maloney 1999, 2004; Cunningham and Maloney 2001).  Here, contrary to the 
segmentation case, formal and informal employment are not necessarily negatively correlated 
over the business cycle.  
                                                 
3
 In this school of thought, formal sector jobs not only command higher wages but also provide fringe benefits 
that are absent with informal sector jobs. 
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Segmentation and integration of the formal and informal labor markets are two very 
polar views regarding the interaction of formality and informality. However, as mooted by 
Fields (1990), it is possible, given the heterogeneity of the informal labor market that these 
features co-exist in the same labor market. Fields subdivides the informal sector of the labor 
market into two categories: an ‘easy-entry’ informal sector, which constitutes the involuntary 
segment, and an ‘upper-tier’ informal sector, where barriers of entry persist and in which 
participation is voluntary. Hence, the labor market is divided into the formal sector, a 
‘disadvantaged’ subsistence-level informal sector and the ‘small firm’ and micro-entrepreneur 
informal sector.  
 The macro evidence presented in this paper is not meant to lead to a confirmation or 
rejection of the above sketched paradigms. Instead it tries to identify channels through which 
informal activities and informal employment are affected in general. Thus far such an exercise 
has not been undertaken in the literature because of a lack of appropriate data. Anticipating 
our findings, we establish that in most fixed effects (FE) specifications a more regulated labor 
market increases the size of the informal economy. In some specifications a larger tax wedge 
also increases the size of informal economic activities. These two results, dominating our 
empirical evidence, are in line with the literature, which identifies labor market regulation and 
the tax wedge as important drivers of informality. The other three labor market institutions 
have little or no predictive power in our regressions.       
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The next section discusses definitions 
of informality, which helps us to better understand the dependent variable in our empirical 
work. In section 3, we sketch those policies that have an impact on the tax wedge and 
regulation and thus on informality. This is followed by a section that looks at tax policies, 
with a focus on the question whether these policies were instrumental in formalizing informal 
activities that existed in the formal economy. Section 5 is the empirical core of the paper, 
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describing the data, the methodology and the main findings of our macroeconometric 
estimations. A final section gives some policy conclusions.    
 
2. Using a broad definition of informality 
The definition of informality and the informal sector poses a challenge in itself due to its very 
nature of not being easily observable (Kanbur 2009; Schneider and Enste 2000; Mead and 
Morrisson 1996). A broad definition defines the informal economy as including “unreported 
income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter 
transactions, hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported 
to the tax authorities” (Schneider and Enste 2000, pp.78-79).4 It is this broad definition that 
we employ in our macroeconometric analysis in this paper, since informality with this very 
general definition encompass activities that totally or partially sidestep the taxing authorities. 
In other words, this definition looks at activities that are 100% informal, but also at informal 
activities within the formal economy.  
However, we could use a more restricted definition of informality, where a 
dichotomous situation is analyzed in the labor market, i.e. a situation where workers are either 
formally or informally employed. This viewpoint essentially restricts itself to the labor market 
and income generating activities of waged workers or the self-employed with earnings. Even 
with this restricted view, informality in the labor market is difficult to pin down and can be 
characterized according to several dimensions, depending on data availability, the legal 
system present and  the nature of the labor market.  
There are two reasons why we use the broader definition of informality in our 
empirical analysis. First, labor market institutions might not only be associated with a 
dichotomous labor market but might also influence informal activities in the formal sector. 
                                                 
4
 This definition excludes unpaid activities such as home production and illicit activities such as drug smuggling. 
A distinction between licit, illicit, legal and illegal is made in the economic sociology literature definition of 
informality (Portes and Haller 2005; Portes and Schauffler 1993).  
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Second, the only data on informality available for the ECA and the LAC regions are the data 
provided by Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010). This source uses the above cited 
broad definition of informality and gives estimates for 162 countries, including Eastern 
European, Central Asian, and Latin American countries over the years 1999 to 2007.    
 
3. The impact of policies to lower labor costs and to reduce regulation  
The literature identifies the tax wedge and labor market regulation as potential channels that 
affect formal employment, unemployment and informal employment. In what follows we 
therefore discuss how lowering labor costs and decreasing the extent of regulation might 
increase formal employment and thus reduce unemployment as well as the size of informal 
activities. In economies where income support for the unemployed is weak or does not exist, 
unemployment is not always an option for those without a formal job. Consequently, 
expansion of formal employment translates, at least partially, into a reduction of informal 
activities. We start off with some simple theoretical predictions and then present some of the 
salient empirical evidence on the nexus of taxes and regulation and formal employment.    
 
3.1 A partial equilibrium model of lowering labor costs to employers 
Extending Katz (1998), we provide a simple graphical exposition of the effects of lowering 
labor costs on employment and wages in figures 1a. – 1.c. These effects of lowering labor 
costs, which are conceptually equivalent to providing wage subsidies to employers, are only 
clear-cut in the polar cases when labor supply is perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic as 
figures 1.a and 1.b demonstrate. Lowering labor costs implies a rightward shift of the labor 
demand curve from Ld(w) to Ld(w[1-s]). When labor supply is perfectly elastic this translates 
into an employment expansion of (L1-L0). For example, we could have a pool of unemployed 
low skilled workers or low skilled workers in informal jobs. If this pool of the 
unemployed/informal workers is large or if in addition w0 is a statutory minimum wage, firms 
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can expand employment without having to raise the wage. In a second scenario where we 
assume a perfectly inelastic labor supply the lower labor costs are “passed through” to 
workers in their entirety leading to a wage hike of (w1-w0) and no additional jobs. Most 
realistic is the scenario between the two polar cases shown in figure 1.c. where the 
comparative statics take place in a relatively elastic portion of the labor supply curve. Now we 
get both an increase in employment and in wages. The relative magnitudes of the effects of 
lowering labor costs on employment and wages are determined by the labor demand and 
supply elasticities. For a given labor demand elasticity, the employment effect will be larger 
the larger the elasticity of effective labor supply, while the wage effect is inversely related to 
the elasticity of effective labor supply.  
Discussion of the empirical evidence on the elasticity parameters leads Katz (1998) to 
conclude that low skilled workers have a higher elasticity of effective labor supply than 
skilled workers. The elasticity of labor demand for low skilled workers also seems to be larger 
in absolute value for low skilled workers. Thus, subsidizing jobs for low skilled workers via 
direct subsidies or via reducing social security contributions might give larger employment 
effects than subsidizing jobs for workers of all skill levels. Of course, in the presence of large 
structural unemployment and/or a minimum wage the employment effects would be 
particularly large. There are, however, at least two problems with direct targeted subsidies. 
Employers might not know about these subsidies, and targeting low skilled workers might 
stigmatize them in the eyes of employers. Of course, when we talk about lowering labor costs 
via a reduction of social security contributions in particular at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, these two problems are not present.  
 
3.2 Empirical evidence on the effects of lowering labor costs to employers 
We report on policies that have attempted to encourage formal job creation through 
decreasing the tax wedge by direct cutting of labor costs or via job or wage subsidies to firms. 
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Since rigorous evaluation studies of such policies are hard to come by we cover a variety of 
country types in this summary.   
There are some special pitfalls in the evaluation of wage or job subsidies or of a 
decrease of labor costs. If these treatments are general, i.e. applying to all firms and workers it 
is basically impossible to find a contemporaneous control group and panel data need be used 
to contrast the average outcome of the treated at the time of the treatment with the average 
outcome of the treated before the time of the treatment. Even when wage or job subsidies are 
targeted, e.g. at all low skilled workers, we have the same difficulties in constructing a 
counterfactual.    
The study by Betcherman, Daysal and Pages (2010), which evaluates regionally 
targeted subsidies in Turkey, is able to establish convincing counterfactuals because they 
exploit the design of the subsidies and the timing of their introduction in a very apt way. In 
addition, they match regions as controls that have similar pre-treatment trends of several 
outcome variables as the treated regions. They thus take account of the point that conditioning 
on the pre-treatment history and on observables reduces selection biases significantly as e.g. 
shown in Heckman et al. (1997) in connection with active labor market policies.  The careful 
construction of counterfactuals by Betcherman et al. produces highly credible results. We, 
therefore, discuss their study in some detail. 
The subsidies in Turkey are targeted at low income regions, where the negative 
characteristics of the Turkish labor market are especially prominent: low job creation, low 
employment and participation rates and a large share of informal workers. The analyzed 
subsidies directed at firms and legislated through Law 5084 (2004) and Law 5430 (2005) and 
containing (i) reductions in employers’ social security ; (ii) credits on income taxes on wages; 
(iii) subsidies on electricity consumption; and (iv) land subsidies were conceived to boost 
formal job creation and employment. The subsidies are targeted at regions with a specified 
relatively low average per capita income and are of the marginal type, i.e. the subsidies are 
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paid on additional formally employed workers. One of the main differences in the design of 
the two subsidy schemes consists in the size threshold beyond which a subsidy can be given. 
Law 5084 foresees a threshold of only 10 employees while Law 5350 raises it to 30 
employees. 
The authors analyze the following outcome variables: formal employment levels and 
growth, number of establishments and earnings. Their findings point to differences in 
employment levels between treated and non-treated regions amounting to roughly 14% (Law 
5350) and 8% (Law 5084). In terms of employment growth these differences amount to 1.8% 
points and 1% point per month respectively. These results thus show large effects regarding 
the expansion of formal employment. Turning to the number of establishments, the results are 
more tenuous since only subsidies emanating form Law 5084 show significant positive effects 
which are robust to the chosen control group and specification. Subsidies connected to Law 
5350 seem to work only at the intensive margin since virtually all specifications show no 
increase in the number of establishments relative to non-treated regions. Using average real 
earnings at the regional level, the authors essentially find no “pass through” of earnings, a 
result that would point to a scenario where the effect of subsidies works through the 
employment channel only (figure 1.a).  
In a complementary study of the Turkish labor market, Papps (2007) investigates the 
effects of changes in labor costs on employment at the lower and upper ends of the wage 
distribution, taking advantage of a quasi-natural experiment. This experiment arises because 
the contribution base of social security contributions for employers and the minimum wage 
changed in July 2004. By constructing a treatment variable that consists in the difference of 
total labor costs over two periods for any gross wage under the assumption that a worker 
holds on to his/her job in both periods, Papps can establish a causal effect of increases in total 
labor costs on employment. The precise outcome variables are overall employment and 
employment in registered jobs and are estimated for workers around the minimum wage thus 
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ensuring homogeneity of unobservables for the treated and the controls. The author uses an 
individual panel for the year 2004 and a pseudo-panel (synthetic panel) for the years 2002 
through 2005.  
The results with the individual panel show small but significant effects of raising labor 
costs: a 1 percentage point rise in total labor costs lowers the probability of being employed 
by 0.64 percentage points for those previously employed. At the mean this implies that an 
increase of 1% of labor costs lowers the probability of being employed by 0.2%. When the 
treatment variable is restricted to those who had previously registered jobs, an increase of 1% 
of labor costs lowers the probability of being employed by roughly 0.1% at the mean. The 
evidence for a shift from formal to informal employment is, however, inconclusive when the 
individual panel is used. With the synthetic panel the results are economically more 
significant: raising labor costs by 1% point lowers employment by roughly 1.1%. If only those 
are treated who had previously a registered job, this effect is 1% point. It is also noteworthy 
that the synthetic panel results show a shift from formal to informal employment by roughly 
2% points when labor costs rise by 1% point. Finally, since treatment might affect 
demographic groups to different degrees5, Papps documents different treatment levels by 
gender, residential status (urban-rural), age group and education. Women tend to have higher 
disemployment rates than men and also tend to shift more frequently from formal to informal 
employment. The same pattern holds for workers under 30 years of age. In contrast, urban and 
rural dwellers show divergent behavior in response to a rise in labor costs, since urban 
workers exit employment, while workers in rural regions, where informal jobs are especially 
abundant, predominantly shift from formal to informal jobs.  
One way to get at the effect of lowering labor costs at the individual level is to produce 
estimates of labor demand elasticities and of the pass through to wages of decreases in labor 
costs. This approach is chosen by Taymaz (2006) who estimates constant output labor demand 
                                                 
5
 For evidence on this point with respect to ALMP see Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt (2008). 
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elasticities for the Turkish manufacturing and construction sectors with a dynamic labor 
demand equation and a wage equation with an employer social security contributions variable 
included as a determinant of wages. The coefficient on the social security contributions 
variable is taken as an estimate of the pass through. Using a GMM-System estimator, Taymaz 
estimates labor demand elasticities that are between -0.41 and -0.64 and are thus at the higher 
end of the elasticities found in developed market economies (Hamermesh 1993). Since he also 
finds relatively fast adjustment speeds in international perspective, his overall results seem to 
imply that the Turkish labor market is very responsive to changes in labor costs. However, 
these changes do not necessarily translate into large changes in employment since Taymaz’ 
estimates of the pass through imply that about 70% of a 1% point fall in social security 
contributions translate into higher wages for workers. So, if we assume an average labor 
demand elasticity of -0.5 a 1% point lowering of social security contributions will only result 
in an expansion of employment amounting to 0.15 %. Particularly important in our context is 
the fact that for low wage workers (with wages just slightly below the minimum wage), the 
pass through estimates are much smaller than for the average worker. So, again we find that 
targeting workers at the low end of the wage distribution might expand employment most. 
The note of World Bank (2005a) also emphasizes this point for the EU8 countries. 
An important study on the pass through of lowering payroll taxes is Jonathan Gruber’s 
(1997) paper. He takes advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Chile where at the 
beginning of the 1980s pension provision was privatized resulting in a dramatic fall of social 
security contributions paid by employers. Consequently, the change in the payroll tax was 
clearly exogeneous, making it possible to establish a causal link between the lowering of the 
payroll tax and changes in wages. To understand Gruber’s contribution it is useful to 
reproduce some of his equations. Labor demand and labor supply are given by the following 
two equations: 
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where  w= pretax  wage; ft = payroll tax rate on firm; and et = payroll tax rate on workers. 
Particularly interesting are the parameters a and q. The parameter a is the fraction by which 
workers discount their payroll tax payments relative to cash income, while q is the extent to 
which workers value employer payments relative to cash income. In the case when workers 
value the social benefits financed by taxation at their full tax cost, a=0 and q=1. In other 
words, workers do not consider their own contributions as a cost to be subtracted from their 
wage since they consider these payments being returned to them as benefits 100% in the 
future. By the same token, when workers think that employer contributions will be 
transformed into benefits for them 100% in the future, they will treat employer contributions 
as cash income. The equilibrium solution of this model becomes: 
)3()1( esd
ds
f athh
hqh
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w
dw
−−
−
= , 
where sh and dh are the supply and demand elasticities. It is easy to show that the right hand 
side of equation (10) becomes -1 under three conditions: 
• Labor supply is perfectly inelastic; 
• Labor demand is infinitely elastic; 
• There is a complete linkage of benefits and taxes (a=0 and q=1). 
When 1−=
fdt
w
dw
, this implies, of course, that the lower payroll tax rate is fully shifted into 
higher wages, i.e. there is no effect on employment at all. Let us look closer at the third 
condition, when a=0 and q=1. Assume that the payroll tax is exclusively used to pay benefits 
to the workers for whom employers pay this tax. Then, when taxes on labor paid the employer 
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fall by a certain amount workers perceive this fall as translating in its entirety into a fall of 
their future benefits. They thus will want to be paid a higher wage that fully compensates for 
this fall in benefits.  
Figure 1.c demonstrates a large albeit not perfect shifting into higher wages of a fall in 
labor cost (let us say that the government wants to subsidize employment by lowering the 
payroll tax). The upward shift in the labor supply curve from Ls(w) to Ls(w)’ demonstrates 
that the same number of workers working ex ante are only willing to work ex post if the wage 
is raised substantially since they interpret the fall in payroll taxes as eating into their future 
benefits. Hence, the wage increase is now much larger, (w1’-w0) compared to (w1-w0), and 
employment expansion is more modest (L1’-L0 and not L1-L0). Undertaking a very careful 
empirical analysis Gruber finds very robust results: lowering payroll taxes does not cause any 
increase in employment since his regression results imply full shifting of lower taxes into 
higher wages. These results hold for both white-collar and blue-collar employees. 
 
3.3 Labor supply effects of lowering the tax wedge  
We now turn to policies which predominantly entail tax incentives on the supply side, 
focusing first on certain parts of the labor market reforms in Germany (“Hartz-reforms”), 
which were enacted at the beginning of the century and further developed and fine-tuned in 
2003. The parts that interest us here relate to the labor legislation that encourages the increase 
or the formalization of jobs in the low wage sector, i.e. legislation regarding “mini-jobs” and 
“midi-jobs”.    
In the case of mini-jobs, the revised law of 2003 foresees that employees who earn up 
to 400€ per month (mini-jobs) do not have to pay any income tax nor social security 
contributions, while the employer pays an overall contribution of 25%, above all for pension 
and health insurance. For mini-jobs in households the employer only pays an overall 
contribution of 12%. The previously existing limit of 15 hours per week has been abolished. It 
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is noteworthy, that employees who in a regular first job pay social security contributions in 
full are allowed to hold a second mini-job where the same conditions hold as for those 
workers who only hold a mini-job. In other words, the additional income from the secondary 
job is not counted in the calculation of social security contributions in connection with the 
primary job. The revised law of 2003 also reduces transaction costs for employers by having 
one institution selected for the whole country to which the contributions have to be paid 
(“Bundesknappschaft”). An important point about mini-jobs in Germany is the fact that 
potential claimants of mini-job status are very well informed about the rules and regulations 
of the law. 
The revised law also stipulates that workers in the low wage sector who earn between 
400.01€ and 800€ (midi-jobs) face a sliding scale of social security payments, i.e. subsidies of 
the employee’s social security contributions declining with earnings are set in place. Before 
the revision of the law the full amount of social security contributions and taxes had to be paid 
by the employee once  monthly earnings exceeded the mini-job threshold of 325€ (the 
threshold of mini-jobs before the revision). As a consequence some workers fell into the 
“social security trap” since a very unfavorable ratio of net to gross wages materialized above 
the threshold leading to strong incentives to keep earnings below 325€ and thus to less hours 
worked than actually desired by employer and employees. The revised law thus clearly 
wanted to encourage employment in the middle and higher segments of the low wage sector. 
In the context of our paper it is also important to stress that one motive for the revised labor 
market legislation was, of course, the formalization of above all informal secondary jobs or of 
informal primary jobs in the middle and high segments of the low wage sector.  Another 
declared aim of the legislation was to have mini- and midi-jobs as a bridge to regular 
employment with earnings above 800€. 
It is uncontroversial that the revised law on mini-jobs has boosted formal employment 
in the bottom part of the low wage sector. While the available estimates are based on data 
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with some limitations, Fertig and Kluve (2006) find an increase of 1.8 million mini-jobs 
between April 2003 and June 2004, which they attribute nearly in its entirety to the new labor 
market legislation. They also establish that men have increased their share of the formal mini-
jobs, which can be explained by a large rise in the incidence of secondary mini-jobs which are 
predominantly held by men. Ernste and Schneider (2006) state that due to the revised law of 
2003, the number of formal mini-jobbers increased from 4.1 to 7.3 million between the spring 
of 2003 and the beginning of 2006.  So, their reading of the data is that having legislation that 
gives the right incentives to formalize jobs held at the low end of the wage distribution can 
result in formalization on a large scale.  Eichhorst et al. (2012) find a large increase of mini-
jobs that are secondary jobs from 1,437,627 in 2003 to 2,492,559 in 2011, while the number 
of mini-jobs that provide the only employment for workers rises modestly from 4,554,180 in 
2003 to 4,894,322 in 2011. This also points to the formalization effect of the legislation of 
formerly informal jobs.   
The employment effects of midi-jobs are a lot more modest. Fertig and Kluve (2006) 
establish that about 38% of those in the earnings range between 400.01€ and 800€ take up the 
scheme. A large number of potential participants are not aware of the scheme or do not 
understand the benefits arising from participation. Being able to estimate the levels of jobs in 
the earnings range in the absence of the scheme (counterfactual scenario) and in its presence, 
the authors take the difference of the two scenarios as the causal impact of the scheme on 
employment levels in the stipulated earnings range. They find this impact to amount to 
roughly 25000 additional employment relationships per quarter. Behind this overall effect is 
hidden a large heterogeneity with respect to gender, age groups and skill levels. Female 
workers are strongly overrepresented in midi-jobs. Low-skilled workers between 25 and 39 
years of age have a substantially higher likelihood to work in this segment of the low wage 
sector as have young workers with medium skills. Relative to the counterfactual scenario, 
older workers with high skills show a slight increase in taking up the scheme.  
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One important concern of the analysis discussed by Fertig and Kluve (2006) and by 
Eichhorst et al. (2012) is the bridging function of mini- and midi-jobs. Both studies find that 
mini-jobs hardly ever end in jobs that require full payment of social security contributions and 
taxes, while there is a substantial increase in such employment relationships for workers who 
previously held midi-jobs. Particularly worrisome is the fact that firms in Germany since the 
inception of the “Hartz reforms” seem to have substituted regular full-time formal jobs with 
part-time mini-jobs on a large scale (Eichhorst et al. 2012). 
A related important study that analyzes the disincentives to formalize jobs at the lower 
end of the wage distribution is the study by Koettl and Weber (2012). The authors investigate 
the role of labor taxation and social benefit design on the disincentives for formal work. They 
propose a new synthetic measure, the formalization tax rate, which takes into account not only 
the costs due to additional taxes one has to pay by engaging in the formal economy but also 
the losses from benefit withdrawal due to formalization. Focusing on some of the European 
New Member States, they find that the disincentives for formal work as measured by the 
formalization tax rate are especially high for low-wage earners and that the higher the 
disincentives the higher is the incidence of informal employment. Their analysis also suggests 
that existing measures such as the tax wedge may not be sufficient in capturing disincentives 
for formal work.  
 
 
3.4. Labor market regulation and informality 
Employment protection is at the center of labor market regulation. We can understand 
employment protection as restrictions imposed on firms that prevent them from using labor 
freely (Addison and Teixeira 2001). A purely neoclassical view of the world invoking 
“Chatelier’s Principle” would thus claim that employment protection a fortiori must result in 
the inefficient use of labor by firms. On the other hand, employment protection, which comes 
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about through national legislation, collective bargaining or judicial process, is put in place to 
protect workers from undue pressures on the part of employers and to guarantee them 
reasonable employment and income stability. What interests economists is, of course, how 
employment protection affects the overall levels of employment and unemployment in the 
medium run and whether the speed of employment adjustment is affected by employment 
protection. Since economic theory is ambiguous about these outcomes there has been a large 
empirical literature trying to answer these questions (for a survey see Addison and Teixeira 
2001). 
The empirical literature has established that the employment of prime-age male 
workers is not affected by employment protection. This very robust finding can have 
implications for the issue of informality and employment protection, since younger and older 
workers show a greater incidence of informal employment. In other words, very restrictive 
employment protection might encourage informal employment of these latter groups of 
workers. Consequently loosening employment protection stipulations for some type of 
employment might decrease informal employment for these workers. For example, in Spain a 
major labor market reform in the 1980s abolished severance pay for temporary work and 
allowed several renewals of temporary jobs. The result of this reform according to 
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2009) was an overall increase in employment, which was 
exclusively driven by a rise of temporary employment contracts. So, one can moot that the 
loosening of regulations for temporary employment decreased informal employment to some 
degree. However, one also needs to keep in mind that this increase in overall employment was 
not associated with a rise in labor productivity and in earnings for firms. A counterfactual 
exercise by these authors that simulated a loosening of employment protection of permanent 
jobs showed a more substantial increase in overall employment and in labor productivity. The 
example of Spain also shows that changing regulations regarding the core of the workforce is 
politically difficult to implement and indicative of the situation that in OECD countries 
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reforms of employment protection are predominantly focused on employment of the 
contingent type. As already mentioned, loosening the regulation of contingent employment 
relationships might, on the other hand, contribute to the formalization of many informal jobs. 
The empirical literature dealing directly with the impact of loosening labor market 
regulation in general and employment protection in particular on informal employment or 
informality has not produced robust and thus credible results. The work done under the aegis 
of the Institute of the German Economy has produced an overall index of regulation and an 
index of labor market regulation for most of the OECD countries (Enste and Hardege 2007). 
The overall index has five components: regulation in product, capital and labor markets, 
regulation in education and innovation as well a good governance index taking into account 
the quality of institutions within which the economy operates. The authors make the salient 
point that any economy needs regulation implemented by public institutions; what matters, 
though, is that regulatory legislation does not create strong incentives to avoid this regulation. 
With the help of macro data Ernste and Hardege perform simple beta regressions in order to 
show the influence of various factors and of the overall regulation index on the size of the 
informal economy. They demonstrate that even if one controls for general tax burden, tax 
ethics, per-capita-income and the unemployment rate, the overall regulation index remains 
highly significant and has a large positive beta coefficient (0.351). They repeat the same 
exercise with the regulation index for the labor market as an explanatory variable and get very 
similar results, i.e. a significant beta coefficient of 0.221. Since these beta regressions are 
based on OLS regressions with two averaged data points, these regressions show correlations 
rather than causal effects running form regulation to the size of the informal economy. 
Nevertheless, these regression results are interesting in that they state that OECD countries 
with high regulation ceteris paribus have a larger informal economy. Consequently reducing 
the strictness of overall regulation and of regulation in the labor market should diminish the 
size of the informal economy. 
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Studies, which are econometrically rigorous and use firm or household micro data, 
have investigated regulation and employment protection and informality with a special focus 
on developing countries, in particular Latin America. These studies, summarized in Kucera 
and Roncolato (2008), show contradictory results, with some analyses suggesting a positive 
relationship between labor market regulation and employment protection and the level of 
informal employment, other studies a negative relationship and some studies no relationship 
at all. So the jury is still out on whether labor market regulation affects informal activities in 
the LAC region.  
 
4. Taxation and informality within the formal sector 
In many countries undeclared work by dependent employees or by the self-employed who do 
operate in the formal economy is a wide-spread phenomenon (see, e.g., Brookmann et al. 
2010 and Sabirianova Peter 2009). In this section, we summarize empirical studies that have 
analyzed the effect of a flat tax reform on the informal economy.  
The paper “Myth and Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion 
Response and Welfare Effects in Russia” by Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez  and 
Sabiarianova Peter (2009) uses the flat tax reform in Russia to establish the effect with respect 
to tax evasion and the productivity effect of the Russian tax reform that imposed a flat tax of 
13 percent on all levels of income as of 2001. The authors employ state-of-the-art methods to 
derive measures of tax evasion and to get convincing empirical estimates of the above 
mentioned effects. The authors use various measures of the consumption-income gap to get at 
the level of tax evasion in Russia and show very convincingly that these large positive gaps 
cannot be attributed to dis-saving. In multivariate regressions they demonstrate that the factors 
driving these gaps are the same factors that are established when tax evasion is directly 
tackled in “Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program” studies. Hence the consumption-
income gap in Russia can be taken as a good proxy for tax evasion.  
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Using the household panel of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
the authors then proceed to establish the “treatment effect” of the tax reform with respect to 
tax evasion using difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity approaches. 
Households whose incomes even before the reform were taxed by 13 percent belong to the 
control group while households whose tax rates were higher before the reform belong to the 
treated group. Essentially subtracting the difference of the consumption-income before and 
after the reform of the treated from the difference of the control group establishes the effect of 
the reform on tax evasion as long as confounding (endogeneity) problems are minimized. The 
authors minimize these problems by using the post-reform income to identify the control and 
treatment groups. Going through several estimation methods and many robustness checks the 
authors establish a large treatment effect of the tax reform in Russia with respect to tax 
evasion as they find that income grows by roughly 11 percent more than consumption.  
The paper also undertakes welfare analysis by asking the question whether lower tax 
rates give a supply side boost to the economy. The authors show that in the presence of large 
tax evasion the positive effects of tax reform might be overstated by conventional approaches. 
Their consumption based approach shows that the productivity effect of tax reform is small 
relative to the tax evasion effect, i.e. they show that an increase in income following tax 
reform is not predominantly driven by an increase in labor supply or other supply side factors 
but is driven by an increase in tax compliance. In other words pre-reform undeclared, i.e. 
informal activities are formalized by Russian workers. 
The paper by Slonimczyk (2012) directly investigates the impact of the Russian tax 
reform on informal activities, using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, covering 
the period 1998-2009 and taking advantage of a special supplement on informality fielded in 
2009. Slonimczyk takes advantage of the fact that some workers are not affected by the 
reform, i.e. that their pre-reform tax rate was 13 percent or less, while other workers 
experience a strong reduction in their tax rate from 21 or 31 percent to 13 percent. This latter 
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group comprises the treated, the former group the controls. Taking various manifestations of 
informality as the dependent variable he then analyzes whether there is a difference in the 
change of informality pre- and post-reform among the two groups, i.e. he estimates the 
difference-in-differences (DID) in the labor market outcomes of interest, performing OLS, 
fixed effects regressions as well as using a semi-parametric matching DID estimator.  
The study finds that the tax reform reduced significantly the incidence of informal 
employment. The largest reduction is observed on the prevalence of informal irregular 
activities and for the individuals in the top income brackets who benefited the most from the 
reform. 
 Sabirianova Peter (2009) gets qualitatively similar results when estimating the 
introduction of a flat tax regime on the size of the informal economy, employing a panel data 
set of 170 countries that spans 25 years. She finds that imposing a flat tax reduces informal 
activities especially at the top of the income distribution. However this effect only works in 
the first year after the introduction but vanishes in the long run. The author also establishes 
that in countries with poor institutions tax cuts do not produce any discernible impact.  
 
 
5. Empirical analysis with macro data 
5.1 Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Data sources  
Our analysis is based on data from several principal sources. The first source is a database of 
the IZA Program Area ‘Labor markets in emerging and transition economies’, which is a new 
hand-collected dataset that provides essential information about the evolution of labour 
markets in the countries of Central Europe and Central Asia. It includes 27 countries of the 
region and spans 4 years, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007. The database contains four key 
variables characterizing labour market outcomes and six key variables describing labour 
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market institutions. The latter include employment protection legislation (OECD version II), 
expenditures on active labor marker programs, tax wedge, unemployment benefit size 
(measured as average benefit to average wage), unemployment benefit duration, and union 
density. There are 71 observations with complete data on these 10 variables, corresponding to 
23 countries. Details about the variables included in the database are shown in the Appendix. 
The second source is new data on labor market institutions in Latin American 
countries provided by the World Bank. This database contains the same institutional variables 
as the mentioned IZA database except for expenditures on active labor market policies, which 
are omitted for data availability reasons. We thus have variables characterizing employment 
protection legislation (OECD version II), the tax wedge, unemployment benefit size and 
duration, as well as union density. This information is available for 25 countries and 3 years, 
namely 1999, 2003 and 2007. The only notable difference with regard to the IZA dataset is in 
measuring unemployment benefit size. Due to information constraints, for Latin American 
countries it is measured as the replacement ratio during the third month in unemployment. 
Further details on this source are available from the authors upon request.  
The third building block is data on the size of the informal economy taken from the 
paper by Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010). This source provides estimates for 162 
countries, including Eastern European, Central Asian, and Latin American countries over 
1999 to 2007. This is a unique dataset providing comparable estimates for most countries of 
the world based on the MIMIC estimation method. 
Finally, we have added some key macroeconomic variables from the World Bank 
database (http://data.worldbank.org/), such as employment to population ratio, GDP growth 
rate and inflation. These variables are commonly used in macro-labor regressions for various 
robustness checks.   
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Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the key variables used in subsequent analysis is shown in Table 1. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides information for the pooled sample of transition economies and 
Latin American countries, and Panels B and C describe the two sub-samples separately.  
As can be seen from the data in Table 1, the size of the informal economy (variable 
INFORMAL) is quite large in the countries sampled (about 38%), and does not differ much 
across the two sub-samples (37% in transition economies and 39% in Latin America). These 
numbers are considerably higher than in the OECD or EU (see Schneider et at. 2010). 
Importantly, the variables measuring labor market institutions and policies are, in general, at 
lower levels than in mature market economies, especially of Western Europe. For the entire 
sample, the EPL appears to be relatively flexible, at the level of 1.56 (variable EPL). This is 
much less than in the OECD or EU, where EPL exceeds 2.0. The tax wedge (variable TAX) is 
non-negligible, although still less than in mature market economies. Unemployment benefit 
(variable BENEFIT) is rather small, and its duration is just 7 months (variable BNFT_DUR), 
on average. Again, this is much less than in most high income countries, especially of 
Western Europe. Union density (variable DENSITY) is at the level of 32%, which is 
considerable.  
The picture becomes more nuanced when we look at the two sub-samples separately. 
In particular, the two groups of countries appear to be similar with respect to only one 
institutional variable, namely the tax wedge. As regards other variables measuring labor 
market institutions and policies, there are notable differences between transition economies 
and Latin American countries. In particular, the EPL, benefit size and duration, as well as 
union density all appear to be much higher in the former group of countries as compared with 
the latter group. As these variables are usually associated with better protection of workers, 
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we conclude that labor market institutions seem to be more labor-friendly in transition 
countries as compared with Latin American countries.6  
Table 2 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between the key variables. Again, we 
present information for the pooled sample (Panel A) and the two regional sub-samples (Panels 
B and C). Statistical significance (at the 5% level) of the correlation coefficients is marked by 
asterisks. As can be seen from raw correlations in Panel A, the informal economy is 
negatively and statistically significantly correlated with all institutional variables save union 
density, where the correlation is positive and statistically significant. Some of these 
correlations appear to be rather counterintuitive, for example, the negative correlation between 
the tax wedge and informal economy. This suggests the importance of more sophisticated 
techniques of analysis aimed at netting out the effect of confounding factors and establishing 
causal links between the variables of interest.  
Panels B and C show some differences in raw correlations between the informal 
economy and labor market institutions across the two sub-samples. In both sub-samples, the 
correlation of the informal economy with EPL is negative, but statistically insignificant. In 
transition countries, the size of the informal economy is negatively correlated with the tax 
wedge and benefit size, and positively correlated with union density. For Latin American 
countries, the only statistically significant correlation is with unemployment benefit duration 
(negatively signed).  
 
5.2 Methodology 
Our analysis of the link between the size of the informal economy on the one hand and labor 
market institutions and policies on the other hand draws heavily on the standard macro-
                                                 
6
 A caveat is due. There may be further aspects of the institutional environment that are not properly reflected in 
the variables presented. These include, for example, law enforcement, eligibility rules for unemployment 
benefits, and bargaining and coverage patterns. We nevertheless believe that the consistent pattern appearing in 
the five key variables available justifies our general conclusion concerning the two regions.       
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regressions proposed in the seminal study by Nickell (1997). In that study, labor market 
outcome variables are related, in a panel regression framework, to a set of variables measuring 
institutions and policies, as well as by the change in inflation. We proceed in an essentially 
similar fashion by considering, in the baseline specification, five variables characterizing 
institutions and policies.  
We note that our results do not necessarily have a causal interpretation as both 
institutions and policies may be shaped by labor market outcomes, for example, via the 
mechanism of elections (Blanchard 2006). Nevertheless, we try to address endogeneity (at 
least some of its sources) by controlling for omitted factors (including unobserved 
characteristics of countries) using random- or fixed-effects specifications of our regression 
model. These are necessary as the paucity of the degrees of freedom does not allow inclusion 
of many potentially relevant explanatory variables. The baseline (pooled OLS) regression 
equation can then be written in the following way: 
 
)4(_ 54321 ititititititit DENSITYDURBNFTBENEFITTAXEPLYINFORMALIT εβββββα ++++++=
 
where index i denotes countries and index t denotes time, t∈{1999, 2003, 2007}, 
INFORMAL stands for the size of the informal economy as measured in Schneider et al. 
(2010), EPL measures the strictness of employment protection legislation, TAX is the tax 
wedge on labor, BENEFIT stands for the average unemployment benefit replacement rate, 
BNFT_DUR stands for the maximum duration of unemployment benefits, DENSITY 
measures union density, and ε is a white noise disturbance. We then proceed by adding 
country and time effects.7 Because macro-trends in the two very remote regions may be very 
different, we allow for different time trends in transition and Latin American countries. We 
then consider additional macro controls: change in inflation and cumulative growth of GDP in 
                                                 
7
 As much of the previous studies, we do not apply logarithmic transformation to the dependent variables in the 
model. 
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the years before labor market outcomes are measured. Last but not least, we estimate the 
regressions separately for each region, transition economies and LAC countries.  
As can be seen from the specification of equation (4), one substantial difference from 
the study by Nickell (1997) and subsequent studies (e.g., Lehmann and Muravyev 2012) is 
that we do not employ variables measuring expenditures on active labor market policies. This 
is both due to data constraints as well as the absence of a clear theoretical link between 
informality and active labor market programs.8 In addition, we do not include variables 
measuring union coverage rates and bargaining type – again, mostly for data reasons, but also 
due to the difficulties in interpreting these variables in less developed countries.9 We, 
however, believe that we capture the essential aspects of wage setting with our union density 
variable since it is regarded as the most important of the related factors (Eichhorst, Feil, and 
Braun 2008).  
 
5.3. Empirical results 
We start with the results of estimating the baseline regressions using three alternative 
specifications: OLS, random-effects (RE), and fixed-effects (FE). Table 3 shows the results. 
The regression in Column 1 is estimated using OLS. In addition to key explanatory variables, 
we add a dummy for Latin American countries in order to account for potential differences 
between the two sub-samples. The results suggest a negative and statistically significant effect 
of the tax wedge on informal economy and a positive effect of union density. There is also a 
negative (albeit marginally statistically insignificant) coefficient on the EPL, suggesting, if 
taken at face value, that stricter employment protection is associated with less informality. We 
have serious doubts regarding these results. In particular, the first result implying that 
                                                 
8
 When we estimated the determinants of the size of the informal economy separately for transition countries and 
included ALMP expenditures (available only for this group of countries), this variable had no predictive power 
in any of the specifications. These results are available upon request. 
9
 For example, how would one interpret data on bargaining in a country where trade unions with high 
membership rates are effectively controlled by the government? It is therefore no surprise that the World Bank 
did not provide statistics on the coverage rates and bargaining type in the CIS countries (World Bank 2005b). 
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increasing taxes reduces informality is especially counterintuitive in the light of the theoretical 
considerations and the discussed empirical evidence on the effects of changing the tax wedge. 
We therefore explore, in Columns 2 and 3, whether it may be endogenous, e.g. driven by 
omission of important factors at the country level.  
 Column 2 shows the results obtained using the random-effects estimator. Interestingly, 
the coefficients on both EPL and tax wedge change signs (to positive), but remain statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient on union density loses statistical significance. Instead, we 
observe negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficients on unemployment 
benefit size and duration. This implies, ceteris paribus, that more generous unemployment 
benefit schemes are associated with lower informality.  
 Next, Column 3 shows the results from the fixed-effects estimation. The picture is now 
very different to what we have seen in Columns 1 and 2. In particular, both EPL and tax 
wedge are now positively and statistically significantly associated with informality. In other 
words, stricter employment protection as well as higher tax wedge on labor increases the size 
of the informal economy. The coefficients on the other variables are statistically insignificant, 
although the corresponding t-statistics are usually greater than unity in absolute value. Note 
that the coefficient on the dummy for LAC countries cannot be estimated in this specification 
as the respective effect is now subsumed in country fixed-effects.  
 Beneath the main estimation results in Column 2 and 3 we report standard diagnostic 
tests, namely the Breusch and Pagan test for random effects and the Hausman test. Both are 
rejected at conventional significance levels. The rejection of the first test suggests the 
importance of unobserved time-invariant effects at the country level (and thus, inferiority of 
OLS specification), the rejection of the latter implies inconsistency of the random effects (and, 
of course, OLS) estimator. Therefore, the fixed-effects estimator appears to be the only one 
which can potentially deliver consistent estimates of the effect of labor market institutions on 
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the size of the informal economy. In what follows we therefore rely on this estimator and skip 
OLS and random-effects specifications altogether.10 
 In Table 4 we expand the analysis presented in Table 3 by adding time effects (which 
are supposed to control for general macro-trends) and testing the importance of missing 
observations as well as of differences in measuring unemployment benefit size between the 
two groups of countries. For comparison purposes, Column 1 reproduces the FE specification 
from Table 3, which is now our baseline specification. Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results 
when the baseline specification is augmented with time effects (assumed common for both 
regions). Here and later in the analysis the base year is 1999. The coefficients on the time 
dummies, therefore, can be interpreted as showing the dynamics of informality net of the 
effect of the institutional variables. In particular, the regression in Column 2 suggests a 
monotonic decline in informality in the sampled countries between 1999 and 2007. Regarding 
the key variables of interest, the coefficients on both EPL and TAX lose statistical 
significance. Instead, we observe a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
BENEFIT suggesting that informality decreases with more generous unemployment benefits 
(higher replacement ratios). The regression in Column 3 differentiates between the macro 
trends in transition and LAC countries. The results suggest that these trends were not the same 
in the two regions of the world: while there seems to have been a steady decrease in 
informality in transition countries, informality appears to have peaked in LAC countries in 
2003. However, the coefficients on the main variables of interest are barely affected by this 
change in specification.    
In Column 4, while controlling for differential macro-trend in the two regions, we drop 
the density variable from the regression. The rational is the presence of too many missing 
observations for this specific variable in LAC region (see Table 1 Panel C). The results are not 
                                                 
10
 The diagnostic tests reject OLS and random-effects estimation methods also in the other specifications that we 
consider below.   
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very different from the previous specifications. The negative coefficient on BENEFIT loses 
statistical significance; all the other institutional variables are insignificant, too.  
Finally, in Column 5 we bring back union density, but now differentiate between 
benefits size in transition and LAC countries (because they are measured somewhat 
differently). This robustness check brings no visible changes to the previously reported 
results. 
The regressions reported in Table 5 introduce several additional control variables: 
employment to population ratio (variable EMP-POP-RAT, the data are taken from the WB 
open sources), GDP growth in period t-1 (variable GDP_GR), and change in inflation in year t 
relative to year t-1 (variable INFL_CH).11 There are two baseline specifications to which 
these extra controls are added – the regression without any time effects (Column 3 Table 3) 
and the regression with differential trends (Column 3 Table 4). Overall, the results in Table 5 
suggest the high importance of lagged GDP growth for informality, with higher growth rates 
associated with decrease in informal economic activity. Employment-to-population ratio 
matters in some specifications while change in inflation has little relevance – at least in our 
regressions – for informality. Looking at the coefficients on the institutional variables, one 
may note that four out of five of them are statistically significant, at least in some 
specifications. The only consistently insignificant institutional variable is union density, 
DENSITY. The coefficients on the other variables have the expected signs. In particular, 
higher EPL as well as higher tax wedge are associated with an increase in informality. 
Unemployment benefit size and duration, are in contrast, negatively related to informal 
economic activity.   
  In Table 6 we analyze the effects of labor market institutions on informal economic 
activity separately for two regions, transition and LAC countries. Odd columns show the 
                                                 
11
 We have also experimented with longer lags. They have worse predictive power while the main coefficients of 
interest stay similar to those reported in the paper.   
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results for transition economies and even columns – for LAC countries. In regressions with 
LAC countries we have to exclude union density from the list of regressors for otherwise the 
number observations drops below 30, which makes the results unreliable. The paucity of the 
degrees of freedom in the two sub-samples makes most of the coefficients statistically 
insignificant. However, some of the results from the previously reported tables survive. In 
particular, the regression in Column 3 confirms the importance of EPL in transition 
economies and the regression in Column 4 confirms the importance of unemployment benefit 
duration in LAC countries. 
 From both research and policy perspectives it may be important to characterize the 
estimated effects quantitatively, as is usual, in terms of elasticities. Below we provide such an 
assessment for several institutional variables based on the results in Table 5. Note that since 
the models estimated are linear, the elasticities will differ for different values of the 
independent variables. We follow the common approach and evaluate them at the sample 
means. Assuming the coefficient on EPL equal to 0.9 (the rough average in the regressions 
where this coefficient is statistically significant) and given the sample average for EPL at the 
level of 1.56 and the sample average for INFORMAL at 38, the elasticity of EPL with respect 
to the informal economy turns out to be about 0.04. In other words, reducing EPL by 1% will 
result in a decrease of informality by 0.04%. Similarly, if we assume the coefficient on the tax 
wedge variable equal to 0.1 and take the sample average for INFORMAL (38) and TAX 
(39.5), the elasticity of the tax wedge with respect to informal economic activities (evaluated 
at the sample mean) is close to 0.1. In other words, decreasing the tax wedge by 1% leads to a 
drop in informality by 0.1%. For the unemployment benefit, the sample mean is 20.5, and the 
coefficients – when statistically significant – average -0.06. These numbers suggest the 
elasticity of unemployment benefit with respect to informal economic activities to be about -
0.03%. In other words, raising unemployment benefit by 1% will result in the decrease of 
informality by a mere 0.03%.  
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6. Conclusions 
Using unique hand-collected country level data on labor market institutions in transition and 
Latin American countries this paper provides some first estimates on the impact of EPL, the 
tax wedge, benefit levels and duration as well as union density on informality in these two 
regions of the world. Our results suggest that mainly two labor market institutions matter for 
informality, confirming the main findings of the literature, which identifies taxes and labor 
market regulation as important determinants of the size of the informal economy.  
Our quantitative assessments show that the tax wedge produces the highest positive 
elasticity. Hence, lowering the tax wedge might be one of the important policy instruments in 
combating informality. The positive impact of EPL on informality, on the other hand, while 
significant is very small. 
Our analysis also strongly suggests that cross-country studies of determinants of 
informality should be based on panel data which allow controlling for unobserved country 
effects. The results from our OLS specifications (where unobserved country effects are not 
controlled for) turn out to be dramatically different from what we obtain in the fixed-effects 
regressions.   
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 Lowering the tax wedge to the employer (employer subsidies) – partial 
equilibrium effects. 
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1.c Labor supply has positive elasticity but is not perfectly elastic 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Panel A: full sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INFORMAL 138 37.99 11.57 16.80 68.30 
EPL 146 1.56 1.03 0 3.60 
TAX 138 39.51 9.14 8.22 77.45 
BENEFIT 132 20.53 19.32 0 80.00 
BNFT_DUR 129 7.39 6.36 0 24.00 
DENSITY 102 32.18 22.31 1.30 94.00 
GDP_GR 159 4.56 4.53 -11.2 20.80 
INFL_CH 141 0.77 7.71 -20.25 31.56 
EMP-POP-RAT 154 55.19 7.04 31.5 69.50 
 
Panel B: transition countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INFORMAL 70 36.86 11.42 16.80 68.30 
EPL 71 2.37 0.55 0.38 3.60 
TAX 76 38.43 5.75 23.00 53.20 
BENEFIT 74 24.90 11.39 0 60.00 
BNFT_DUR 74 11.02 5.46 0 24.00 
DENSITY 69 40.79 20.78 13.17 94.00 
GDP_GR 84 5.57 4.79 -11.20 20.80 
INFL_CH 73 0.87 9.21 -20.25 31.56 
EMP-POP-RAT 79 51.43 6.83 31.50 65.00 
 
Panel C: Latin American countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INFORMAL 68 39.16 11.70 18.50 67.70 
EPL 75 0.79 0.75 0 3.10 
TAX 62 40.82 11.99 8.22 77.45 
BENEFIT 58 14.96 25.20 0 80.00 
BNFT_DUR 55 2.50 3.64 0 12.00 
DENSITY 33 14.19 12.65 1.30 63.10 
GDP_GR 75 3.43 3.95 -10.89 13.20 
INFL_CH 68 0.66 5.74 -12.42 29.42 
EMP-POP-RAT 75 59.15 4.74 49.10 69.50 
Notes: INFORMAL is the dependent variable in the analysis; measures the share size of the 
informal economy according to Schneider et al. (2010). Key independent variables: EPL 
measures stringency of employment protection legislation, TAX is the tax wedge on labor, 
BENEFIT is the size of unemployment benefits, BNFT_DUR is the duration of 
unemployment benefits, and DENSITY is union density. Control variables: GDP_GR is GDP 
growth between time t-1 and t, INFL_CH is change in inflation betwee time t-1 and t, and 
EMP-POP-RAT stands for employment-to-population ratio. 
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Table 2. Raw correlations. 
 
Panel A: full sample 
 INFORM EPL TAX BENEFIT BNFT_D DENSIT
INFORMAL 1       
EPL -0.23* 1      
TAX -0.25* 0.14 1     
BENEFIT -0.22* 0.18* 0.14 1    
BNFT_DUR -0.34* 0.58* 0.13 0.51* 1   
DENSITY 0.26* 0.43* -0.30* 0.27* 0.37* 1  
GDP_GR -0.03 0.17* -0.12 -0.16 -0.02 -0.08 
INFL_CH 0.18* -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 
EMP-POP-RAT 0.31* -0.53* -0.17* -0.27* -0.60* -0.38* 
 
Panel B: transition countries 
 INFORM EPL TAX BENEFIT BNFT_D DENSIT
INFORMAL 1      
EPL -0.04 1      
TAX -0.47* 0.25* 1     
BENEFIT -0.32* 0.17 0.27* 1    
BNFT_DUR -0.24 0.22 0.27* 0.52* 1   
DENSITY 0.55* 0.18 -0.35* -0.06 -0.03 1  
GDP_GR 0.07 -0.05 -0.34* -0.14 -0.23* -0.20 
INFL_CH 0.26* 0.05 -0.11 -0.13 0.00 0.17 
EMP-POP-RAT 0.21 -0.41* -0.18 -0.26* -0.28* -0.11 
 
Panel C: Latin American countries 
 INFORM EPL TAX BENEFIT BNFT_D DENSIT
INFORMAL 1      
EPL -0.21 1     
TAX -0.20 0.38* 1    
BENEFIT -0.16 -0.09 0.21 1   
BNFT_DUR -0.49* 0.05 0.57* 0.62* 1   
DENSITY -0.13 -0.01 0.35* 0.56* 0.49* 1  
GDP_GR -0.13 0.02 0.05 -0.33* -0.33* -0.19 
INFL_CH 0.07 -0.05 -0.16 -0.02 -0.24 -0.22 
EMP-POP-RAT 0.47* 0.04 -0.50* -0.14 -0.51* -0.25 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 3. Comparing different estimation methods: OLS, RE, and FE results. 
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) 
INFORMAL OLS RE FE 
EPL -2.638 0.396 1.375* 
 (1.943) (0.856) (0.717) 
TAX -0.675*** 0.056 0.136** 
 (0.174) (0.066) (0.063) 
BENEFIT -0.027 -0.080* -0.087 
 (0.064) (0.047) (0.056) 
BNFT_DUR -0.323 -0.253* -0.104 
 (0.272) (0.130) (0.114) 
DENSITY 0.176*** 0.058 0.044 
 (0.063) (0.037) (0.037) 
LAC 6.499 0.666  
 (6.180) (4.748)  
INTERCEPT 64.703*** 34.988*** 28.317*** 
 (9.816) (5.853) (3.426) 
R2 0.41 0.11a 0.24b 
N 85 85 85 
Diagnostics    
Breusch&Pagan chi2(1)  35.15  
Prob>chi2  (0.000)  
Hausman chi2(5)   22.68 
Prob>chi2   (0.000) 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors (clustering on countries) are reported 
in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, 
and *** for 1%.  
a overall R2. 
b within R2. 
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Table 4. Comparing different models. 
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INFORMAL FE FE FE FE FE 
EPL 1.375* 0.609 0.506 0.418 0.464 
 (0.717) (0.404) (0.410) (0.428) (0.442) 
TAX 0.136** -0.002 0.008 -0.039 0.008 
 (0.063) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
BENEFIT -0.087 -0.066* -0.070* -0.061 -0.086 
 (0.056) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.057) 
BNFT_DUR -0.104 -0.049 -0.052 -0.076 -0.053 
 (0.114) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.070) 
DENSITY 0.044 0.009 0.008  0.007 
 (0.037) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.015) 
YEAR2003  -1.191*** -1.537*** -1.646*** -1.606*** 
  (0.227) (0.238) (0.286) (0.305) 
YEAR2007  -3.457*** -3.657*** -3.852*** -3.709*** 
  (0.361) (0.449) (0.476) (0.494) 
LAC*YEAR2003   1.301*** 1.622*** 1.404*** 
   (0.473) (0.500) (0.512) 
LAC*YEAR2007   0.775 0.474 0.773 
   (0.765) (0.625) (0.764) 
BENEFIT*LAC     0.038 
     (0.062) 
INTERCEPT 28.317*** 37.433*** 37.338*** 41.006*** 37.641*** 
 (3.426) (2.018) (1.911) (1.741) (2.093) 
R2 0.24 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.83 
N 85 85 85 105 85 
Notes: Regression with country fixed-effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustering on 
countries) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 
5%, and *** for 1%.  
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Table 5. Robustness checks with different additional controls. 
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INFORMAL FE FE FE FE FE FE 
EPL 1.095 0.380 1.505** 0.706*** 1.181** 0.545** 
 (0.817) (0.454) (0.583) (0.241) (0.472) (0.232) 
TAX 0.123* 0.004 0.085* -0.015 0.099* -0.030 
 (0.062) (0.029) (0.048) (0.020) (0.055) (0.035) 
BENEFIT -0.074 -0.071* -0.064 -0.060** -0.043 -0.046** 
 (0.057) (0.038) (0.044) (0.022) (0.043) (0.021) 
BNFT_DUR -0.128 -0.062 -0.152* -0.088* -0.085 -0.079* 
 (0.105) (0.062) (0.077) (0.046) (0.065) (0.046) 
DENSITY 0.042 0.007 0.024 0.000 0.022 0.001 
 (0.039) (0.015) (0.027) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013) 
YEAR2003  -1.669***  -1.325***  -1.117*** 
  (0.219)  (0.246)  (0.250) 
YEAR2007  -3.663***  -3.131***  -2.928*** 
  (0.447)  (0.292)  (0.346) 
LAC*YEAR2003  1.430***  0.495  0.030 
  (0.479)  (0.420)  (0.482) 
LAC*YEAR2007  0.976  0.259  -0.216 
  (0.802)  (0.563)  (0.797) 
EMP-POP-RAT -0.224* -0.062     
 (0.113) (0.064)     
GDP_GR   -0.119*** -0.070*** -0.167*** -0.094*** 
   (0.041) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) 
INFL_CH     -0.003 0.002 
     (0.005) (0.003) 
INTERCEPT 41.233*** 41.133*** 31.962*** 38.841*** 32.085*** 40.126*** 
 (7.072) (3.569) (2.826) (1.428) (2.662) (1.968) 
R2 0.31 0.83 0.52 0.90 0.67 0.92 
N 85 85 85 85 77 77 
Notes: Regression with country fixed-effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustering on 
countries) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 
5%, and *** for 1%.  
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Table 6. Comparing results for the two regions. 
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INFORMAL TEs LAC TEs LAC 
 FE FE FE FE 
EPL 0.259 0.823 1.237*** -2.862 
 (0.436) (0.918) (0.416) (3.083) 
TAX 0.079 -0.068 0.053 -0.033 
 (0.063) (0.044) (0.064) (0.094) 
BENEFIT -0.086 -0.033 0.004 -0.048 
 (0.051) (0.021) (0.046) (0.064) 
BNFT_DUR -0.054 0.079 -0.066 -1.091*** 
 (0.058) (0.151) (0.062) (0.258) 
DENSITY 0.027  0.031  
 (0.018)  (0.029)  
YEAR2003 -1.413*** -0.147   
 (0.271) (0.427)   
YEAR2007 -3.374*** -3.494***   
 (0.532) (0.414)   
GDP_GR   -0.173*** -0.328*** 
   (0.033) (0.052) 
INFL_CH   -0.004 -0.155** 
   (0.004) (0.054) 
INTERCEPT 34.458*** 42.799*** 31.192*** 50.060*** 
 (3.392) (2.542) (2.609) (5.298) 
R2 0.85 0.81 0.76 0.71 
N 58 46 55 39 
Notes: Regression with country fixed-effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustering on 
countries) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 
5%, and *** for 1%.  
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Appendix – IZA-World Bank Panel Data Base 
The data used in the analysis is a combination of the database of the IZA Program Area 
“Labor markets in emerging and transition economies” and data on LAC countries provided 
by the World Bank. The first database is a new hand-collected dataset that provides essential 
information about the evolution of labor markets in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. It includes 27 countries of the region and spans 14 years, 1995-2007 
(data are collected every 4 years). The database contains 4 variables characterizing labor 
market outcomes, among them the employment to population ratio for workers aged between 
15 and 59, and 6 variables describing labor market institutions and policies. There are 71 
observations with complete data on these 10 variables, corresponding to 23 countries. The 
database of the World Bank provides information on essentially the same characteristics 
(except for expenditures on active labor market policies) for 25 countries from LAC region in 
1999, 2003, and 2007. The details about the variables proxying for labor market institutions 
and polices are presented in what follows.   
 
Labor market institutions and policies in transition countries: 
• Employment protection legislation (EPL) index is based on version 2 of the OECD 
(2004) indicator and is a weighted average of 18 cardinal summary indicators of EPL 
strictness which can be gathered in three main areas: (i) employment protection of 
regular workers against individual dismissal; (ii) specific requirements for collective 
dismissals; (iii) regulation of temporary forms of employment. 
• Active labor market policies (ALMP) – expenditures on active measures of labor 
market policies and public employment services as per cent of the country’s GDP. 
Note: this variable is not available for LAC countries.  
• Tax wedge on labor (TAX) is defined as the difference between the salary costs of a 
single “average worker” to their employer and the amount of net income (“take-home-
pay”) that the worker receives. The taxes included are personal income taxes, 
compulsory social security contributions paid by both employees and employers, as 
well as payroll taxes for the few countries that have them; no consumption taxes are 
included. 
• Union density (DENSITY) measures trade union density based on surveys, wherever 
possible. Where such data were not available, trade union membership and density 
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were calculated using administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed 
members.12 
• Average unemployment benefit (BENEFIT) – the average benefit as percentage of the 
average wage. This deviates from the estimates typically used by the OECD because 
OECD replacement rates are not very meaningful in the transition countries due to the 
caps on the size of the benefit in many countries.13 For LAC countries, the variable is 
defined as the replacement ratio during the third month in unemployment. 
• Maximum duration of unemployment benefits (BNFT_DUR) – defined as the period 
for which a person aged 40 years who has been employed for 22 years prior to 
unemployment receives unemployment benefits, wherever possible.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 A caveat concerning the quality of the union density data is due. There is a measurement problem in at least 
some of the selected countries. The World Bank notes, for instance, that “Armenia provides an example of the 
difficulty of interpreting union density figures in the CIS, with 75 percent union density by official estimates, but 
80 percent of workers claiming to “have nothing in common” with trade unions, and half of those claiming to be 
totally uninformed about unions.” For that reason the World Bank (2005b) did not provide any statistics on the 
coverage rates in the CIS countries. Whenever possible we therefore examined alternative estimates of 
unionization, especially in the CIS countries.  
13
 In most countries of the region, the size of the unemployment benefit is related to past earnings. The rate may 
be as high as 100% (like in Croatia at the end of the 1990s and in Ukraine in the mid-2000s). The problem is that 
there is an upper cap on the size of the benefit, which often implies, de facto, a flat rate benefit. For example, in 
the early 2000s the benefit replacement rate in Croatia was 100% of average salary in the last three months of 
employment, but the maximum was restricted to 900 Kn. Compared to the average wage of 3600 Kn, the amount 
is far less than the 100% replacement rate. Similarly, the unemployed in Russia can get 75% of their average 
wage in the last three months of employment, but there is a cap of 4900 RUR (or 110 Euro) as of mid-2009. 
Relative to the average wage in the economy (17441 RUR as of 1st quarter 2009), the unemployment benefit is 
very low. The minimum benefit is almost negligible, amounting to 850 RUR only. It is essential that the 
minimum and maximum amounts of unemployment benefits are not established by a law, but are subject to 
government discretion.  
 
 
